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Abstract. Scientists are becoming increasingly aware of a “replicability crisis” in the behavioral, 
social, and biomedical sciences. Researchers have made progress identifying statistical and 
methodological causes of the crisis. However, the social structure of science is also to blame. In 
the fields affected by the crisis, nobody is explicitly responsible and rewarded for doing 
confirmation and replication work. This paper makes the case for a social structural reform to 
address the problem. I argue that we need to establish a reward system that supports a dedicated 
group of confirmation researchers and formulate a proposal that would achieve this. 
 
Introduction 
In many productive spheres in society, when we really care about a job being done right, a third 
party is responsible for verifying that this is the case, even if sporadically and randomly. You 
would not trust a food company that bypasses inspection by the Food and Drug Administration. 
Nor would you like to fly on an airplane that runs with software that has not been independently 
tested. And although nobody enjoys a tax audit, most of us agree that there should be tax auditors. 
Given that we value these jobs, there is a reward system for them. Should we not treat science 
with as much care? 
Scientists are becoming increasingly aware of a “replicability crisis” in the behavioral, social, 
and biomedical sciences (Baker, 2016). In recent years, independent researchers have 
unexpectedly failed to replicate many findings (i.e., when they repeat the original experiment they 
do not obtain the original result.) The estimates of replicability success are worryingly low: 36% 
in experimental psychology (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) and 11–20% in cancer research 
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(Prinz et al., 2011; Begley et al., 2012). Many of the findings that fail to replicate have not only 
been published in prominent journals but also influenced other scientists and the public.  
Researchers have made progress identifying statistical and methodological causes of the crisis 
(Simmons et al., 2011, John et al., 2012, Ioannidis, 2008, see Romero, 2019, for review), and 
forcefully defended statistical and methodological reforms (Cumming, 2012; Lee & 
Wagenmakers, 2013, Chambers, 2013, Machery, 2019, Mayo, 2019).  
Now, the social structure of science is also to blame. In theory, confirmation, which includes 
replication amongst other practices, is an essential step in the scientific process (but see Leonelli, 
2018 and Feest, 2019). However, in the fields affected by the crisis, nobody is explicitly 
responsible and rewarded for doing confirmation work. Scientists in these fields work under a 
reward system that encourages novelty at the expense of careful confirmation efforts. Career 
pressures encourage them to rush low-quality research into print and place too much trust in 
unreliable research. Quality control in these fields relies on peer-review, which at best establishes 
the plausibility of findings but never their reliability.  
But, can we change the social structures of science to make science more replicable? If so, 
what would the suitable structures look like? These critical questions remain unaddressed. (And 
indeed, this is an area ripe for social epistemological work and philosophy of science in practice.) 
This paper takes steps to address them and proposes a social structural reform. Like food 
inspection, software testing, and tax audits, I argue that we should treat confirmation in science 
with the care that it deserves and sketch a proposal that does precisely this in the context of 
laboratory-based research with convenience samples. This proposal suggests establishing a 
reward system that supports a dedicated group of confirmation researchers. Transforming the 
social structure of science might seem a utopian goal. But we need to bring the social structure to 
the forefront of the replicability crisis discussion. Without devising alternatives to the current 
system, statistical and methodological reforms will fall short in addressing the crisis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 explains why confirmation 
research is essential for scientific self-correction and how confirmation and, in particular, 
replication work, is neglected. Section 2 presents my proposal, which I call the “professional 
scheme.” Section 3 presents three arguments in favor of this scheme, and Section 4 discusses three 
objections. 
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1. Replication: Three Problems 
Philosophers and methodologists distinguish exploratory research and confirmatory research 
(Steinle, 1997; Sakaluk, 2016). The former is research that looks for patterns, often in an unguided 
way, while the latter tests predefined hypotheses. In practical terms, if the hypothesis of a study 
is formulated before the study is conducted (and not changed while it is conducted or afterward), 
then the research is confirmatory. Although different, these two types of research are related. For 
instance, the results of exploratory projects may inspire hypotheses that researchers later approach 
in a confirmatory mode. And in some subfields, projects lay somewhere in an exploratory-
confirmatory continuum (Wright, 2017). 
Replication is an exemplary confirmatory practice. There are different definitions of the term 
(see Romero, 2019, for discussion). For my purposes here, replication is an experiment that 
mirrors an original experimental design in all factors that are purportedly causally responsible for 
the effect. In a typical replication project, the replicator tests the same hypothesis specified in the 
original study using the same methods. It is by conducting this sort of experiment and failing at 
alarming rates that the crisis emerged. Now, while replication has been the focus of the crisis, 
replication does not exhaust confirmation. Other critical confirmatory practices are reproduction 
(i.e., re-running analysis over pre-existing data), meta-analysis, and theory criticism. 
Why is confirmatory research necessary? The reason that concerns me here is its connection 
with scientific self-correction. In theory, philosophers regard science as self-corrective: in the long 
run, science corrects its errors and converges on true theories (Peirce, 1901/1958; Reichenbach, 
1938). Confirmation work is essential in this process. A single experiment can give us a correct 
finding, but we do not know the finding is correct without proper confirmation. The finding can 
be the result of a lucky accident or other sources of error. By conducting confirmation work, 
scientists can correct such errors. In particular, the combination of replication work and statistical 
inference offers one straightforward instantiation of this self-corrective process: as the number of 
replications of an experiment increases, the meta-analytical aggregation of their effect sizes 
approaches the true effect size with narrow confidence intervals.  
Despite its theoretical importance, the practice of confirmation is far from the theory. The 
replicability crisis reveals that several subfields in 
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neglect confirmation work and replication in particular. Specifically, we can identify three 
problems: 
1. Replication work is not independent. When a replication attempt happens, usually the 
original author of the finding (or close collaborators) conducts it (Makel et al., 2012). These 
replications are epistemically questionable as original authors have a conflict of interest when 
judging their own work. Indeed, suspiciously, replication attempts by original authors are more 
successful than those by independent authors (Makel et al., 2012; Kunert, 2016).  
2. Replication work is not systematic. Very few findings are subject to replication attempts 
(Makel et al., 2012). Replication attempts happen in isolation (e.g., they stem from individual 
researchers’ initiatives) and not as a standard practice to test important findings rigorously (e.g., 
replicating multiple times and across different conditions.) 
3. Replication work is not sustainable. While many researchers acknowledge the epistemic 
value of replication, there are few material incentives to conduct replications (Nosek et al., 2012; 
Koole & Lakens, 2012). Relative to novel research, replication is under-rewarded. Hence, 
researchers who want to advance in their careers are better off conducting novel research. 
As these problems arise from social structural conditions, I suggest that we need social reforms 
to address them. I use the notion of self-corrective labor schemes. These schemes specify how 
scientists should organize their confirmation efforts, which involves establishing roles, 
responsibilities, and communication rules. (See Romero, 2018, for a discussion of different 
scheme proposals).  Here I defend one scheme, which I call the professional scheme. 
 
2. A Proposal: The Professional Scheme 
The professional scheme proposes an alternative way of organizing confirmation work. This 
scheme has two main features. First, there is a specialized group of confirmation researchers. 
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2.1 Division of Labor 
The first feature of the professional scheme is that a specialized group of scientists conduct 
confirmation work (i.e., replication, reproduction, meta-analysis, and theory criticism). Given its 
increasing complexity, contemporary science requires the division of cognitive labor (Kitcher, 
1990; Weisberg & Muldoon, 2009). Currently, scientists divide their subject matter: they 
specialize and contribute to distinct fields. However, this is not the only way we can conceive the 
division. We can also divide cognitive labor according to stages of the research process. Indeed, 
Francis Bacon advocated for such a division in his New Atlantis novel (1627/2000), which is 
perhaps the earliest account of institutionalized science. In the New Atlantis, some researchers 
specialize in designing experiments; others conduct them, others analyze the data and generalize 
findings. 
In line with this idea, the professional scheme distinguishes two kinds of scientific workers. 
The first kind is the most common kind of academic scientist today, which I call discovery 
researchers. The second is a new kind, which I call confirmation researchers. These two kinds 
are distinct across three dimensions: (1) the type of research that they conduct (i.e., exploratory 
or confirmatory), (2) the epistemic goal that they have when approaching their research, and (3) 
the target findings that they study. (See Table 1) 
 
 Discovery Researchers Confirmation Researchers 
Type of research Exploratory and 
Confirmatory 
Confirmatory 
Epistemic goal Theoretical innovation Assess the reliability of 
findings 
Target findings Their own findings Others’ findings 
Table 1. Discovery Researchers and Confirmation Researchers. 
 
On the one hand, discovery researchers engage in both exploratory and confirmatory projects–
perhaps more the former, as it is the case today. Their main epistemic goal is theoretical 
innovation, and they work primarily in producing their own findings and sometimes analyzing 
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findings from their colleagues. On the other hand, confirmation researchers constitute a new kind. 
First, the type of research that they conduct is primarily confirmatory. Second, unlike discovery 
researchers who prioritize innovation, the epistemic goal of confirmation researchers is to assess 
the reliability of findings. And third, they work with others’ findings as their object of study. That 
is, confirmation researchers support the self-corrective process in their subfields. To be clear, the 
proposal is not to change how most researchers work today. Discovery researchers may still 
conduct confirmatory research. Instead, the proposal adds confirmation researchers for error-
control purposes within their fields. 
While confirmation researchers do not look for new discoveries, their work requires a high 
degree of skill and creativity and therefore, should not be perceived as second class work. 
Experimentally, confirmation researchers should be skilled at discovering confounding variables, 
evaluating the boundary conditions of effects, and optimizing experimental procedures. 
Analytically, they should be skilled at cutting-edge statistical tools and meta-analytic tools to 
evaluate large bodies of work. Additionally, since confirmation work is resource intensive, 
confirmation researchers should be competent at establishing and maintaining collaborations with 
other laboratories, e.g., conducting multi-site projects. This profile should be further tailored to 
specific subfields. For instance, in subfields that rely heavily on secondary data analysis, 
confirmation researchers should be skilled at reproduction (as opposed to replication), which 
involves re-analysis, testing hypothesis over existing data sets, and running alternative models. 
2.2. Division of Reward Systems 
In the professional scheme, discovery researchers work under a novelty-based reward system. 
This is indeed the reward system that currently governs academic research. In this system, 
characterized by sociologists and economists of science as “the priority rule,” scientists are 
rewarded for making new discoveries (Merton, 1957; Stephan, 2012). They establish priority via 
peer-reviewed publication, and their reward is prestige (i.e., recognition from their peers), which 
comes in the form of positions, career advancement, and prizes. There are, of course, financial 
benefits. However, they are derived from the prestige acquired by the scientist acquires and are 
not her primary motivation. 
Now, confirmation researchers require a reward system that is not based on novelty. This 
because confirmation, and replication work, in particular, is not novel work. Hence, it is at odds 
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with the priority rule (Koole & Lakens, 2012; Romero, 2017). Unlike discovery researchers, 
confirmation researchers’ rewards cannot depend on being first in showing that a finding is 
correct. 
To address this problem, the professional scheme proposes that confirmation researchers work 
under a service-based reward system. This reward system compensates them for providing their 
confirmation efforts and supporting the self-corrective process in their subfield. They are 
rewarded for conducting confirmation projects, which do not propose new hypotheses, so long as 
the projects are of high quality. To make the idea intuitive, think of industry research. In the 
industry context, there is already a thriving service-based economy for research. For instance, 
biotech companies employ highly skilled staff scientists who are rewarded for executing research 
experiments, or being technical experts as opposed to driving novel ideas or novel experimental 
designs. Their financial rewards are not derived from the prestige of publishing in journals and 
come directly from providing their services. 
Now, the implementation of a service-based reward system for academic research can be done 
by establishing confirmation-research-track positions for professors. Currently, universities 
allocate professors’ time to different tasks, e.g., research, teaching, advising, and administration. 
The proposal is to create positions in which the professor’s research time is exclusively allocated 
to confirmation work. One related precedent shows that this is plausible. Recently, principal 
investigators have created Ph.D. positions for confirmation projects (see, Ph.D. position in 
Psychology of Religion, 2017, for an example). A confirmation research track would extend this 
precedent to the professorial level. To make these positions viable as a career, universities need 
to acknowledge confirmation work in their promotion requirements. This involves focusing on 
the quality of the studies rather than their novelty. This can be done with metrics such as the 
number of studies with high statistical power, the number of pre-registered studies, the number of 
studies with open data (see Schönbrodt et at, 2015, for an example of these metrics.), as opposed 
to the sheer number of publications.  
To support confirmation research track positions, funding agencies also need to intervene by 
providing steady funding for confirmation research. That is, part of the funds that they currently 
allocate to exploratory projects has to be consistently allocated to confirmation and replication 
projects. Funding agencies have already set a precedent in this respect. For instance, the Laura 
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and John Arnold Foundation launched a program to fund replication projects in cancer biology 
(“Reproducibility Initiative,” 2013); and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research 
launched a 3-year program for the same purpose (Netherlands Organization for Scientific 
Research, 2016). An effective intervention to support confirmation researchers would be to make 
these pilot programs standard.  
 
3. Arguments for the Professional Scheme 
The professional scheme addresses the three problems mentioned in Section 2, the independence 
problem, the systematicity problem, and the sustainability problem. In this section, I explain these 
problems in more detail and why the professional scheme offers a solution to them. 
3.1. Independence argument 
Let us look more closely at the problem that replication work is not independent. In the current 
system, when scientists conduct replication work, they need specific outcomes from that work to 
further their careers. We have two scenarios. First, when scientists replicate their own work or 
work that supports their own theoretical commitments, they need the outcome of the replication 
to be successful. For if they fail, they would be shooting themselves in the foot–perhaps even 
contradicting years of their own work. The second scenario is when scientists replicate someone 
else’s work. In this case, they need the replication to fail. If they succeed, they would be nothing 
but second stringers. Failing, on the other hand, may give them visibility for proving the original 
author wrong. This would be indeed the most desirable outcome for the replicator if the target 
finding contradicts her theoretical commitments. 
Now, if scientists need specific outcomes from their replication attempts, then they have a 
conflict of interest that puts them in an inadequate epistemic position. That is, their expectation 
for a specific outcome conflicts with their aim to do good science, which can result in any 
outcome. This conflict of interest makes the current system unsuitable to conduct independent 
replications. The situation is aggravated if the pressure to obtain a reward is too high. In such 
cases, the replicator is more likely to introduce error, even unconsciously. She may engage in 
questionable research practices (QRPs; John, Loewenstein & Prelect, 2012), HARKing 
(hypothesizing after results are known; Kerr, 1998) or p-hacking (Simmons, Nelson, & 
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Simonsohn, 2011). She may find it harder to resist confirmation bias (Ioannidis et al., 2014; 
Nuzzo, 2015), and may even engage in fraud. This may explain the evidence that authors that 
replicate their own work are more likely to “succeed” than other researchers (Makel et al., 2012). 
By contrast, in the professional scheme, replication work is truly independent. In the 
professional scheme, confirmation researchers’ incentives and rewards are entirely disconnected 
from the outcomes of their confirmation work. They can conduct replication work without 
conflicting interests because they do not need their replication projects to succeed or fail in 
supporting a hypothesis. In particular, unlike the scientist who replicates her own work, the 
confirmation researcher is not invested in furthering a particular theory. And unlike the scientist 
who replicates other’s work, the confirmation researcher does not conduct replications with the 
expectation of proving the other wrong. 
3.2. Systematicity argument 
Many replication failures lead to epistemically justified disagreements between the original 
experimenter and the replicator. This is especially the case when we have only one experiment, 
and only one failed replication attempt, as is often common. In these cases, it is possible to 
question the epistemic import of either. At least four factors make the contradiction likely: (1) 
Random variation; (2) the commonality of QRPs (John, Lowestein & Prelect, 2012); (3) 
undiscovered mediators and moderators (Cesario, 2014); or (4) the difficulties of importing 
original designs from other labs (Bissell, 2013). 
When replications are systematic, it is feasible to overcome these disagreements, but often they 
are not. Systematic replication occurs when a finding is rigorously tested across factors that could 
introduce variation. That is, replication of the finding has been attempted multiple times, by 
different experimenters at different laboratories with different populations. As an example, multi-
site replication projects that have engaged in systematic work have successfully assessed the 
robustness of important findings. (Open Science Collaboration, 2012; Klein et al., 2014; Ebersole 
et al., 2016). Although not all findings deserve such a rigorous treatment, very few findings get 
it.  
The professional scheme creates appropriate conditions for systematic replication. A 
confirmation researcher’s job is precisely to evaluate the robustness of findings rigorously. They 
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can do this in two ways. First, they can explore the boundary conditions of effects, manipulating 
potential mediators and moderators, and uncovering the details of the mechanisms responsible for 
the phenomena. Second, they can coordinate large scale multi-site projects to obtain more precise 
estimates of parameters of interest, in particular, effect sizes. Notice that confirmation researchers 
are in a better position to engage in these projects than discovery researchers. These projects result 
in papers and reports with dozens of authors and therefore provide few incentives for the discovery 
researcher. 
The professional scheme has further advantages that arise from combining systematic and 
independent replication. Imagine we have resources to conduct ten replications of an experiment. 
Consider two alternative scenarios. In scenario 1, we allocate resources to one scientist to replicate 
the experiment ten times and pool the results. In scenario 2, we allocate resources to ten 
independent scientists to replicate the experiment one time and pool the results. Assume that 
sample sizes, materials, experience, etc., are the same in both scenarios. Scenario 2 is 
epistemically better than scenario 1 because scenario 2 is both systematic and independent, 
whereas scenario 1 is only systematic. Scenario 2 is more feasible under the professional scheme 
than under the current system. 
Another advantage of combining systematic and independent replication is sociological. Some 
authors these days interpret replication attempts as aggressive personal attacks (see Yong, 2012; 
Bohannon, 2014, who document examples of this). While these reactions are extreme, they should 
not surprise us given that replication attempts are rare and there is a prize for replication failure. 
If replication becomes a systematic practice conducted by independent confirmation researchers, 
the debates after a replication failure can focus on epistemic aspects of the research being 
questioned rather than alleged questionable motives. 
3.3. Sustainability argument 
As we saw, a novelty-based reward system, in general, does not reward and hence does not 
incentivize replication work. Also, the only scenario in which researchers are potentially rewarded 
(i.e., proving an original scientist wrong) creates a conflict of interest. This situation undermines 
the independence of replication. Additionally, under a novelty-based reward system, replicating 
a finding multiple times is strongly discouraged. This undermines systematic replication. 
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Some authors have advocated for changes in the publication system to reward replication. 
Already in the 1970s, scientists tried (and failed) to establish a journal for replication research 
(Campbell & Jackson, 1970). Recently, online archives, such as the PsychFileDrawer Website, 
have provided a venue too. And prestigious journals have also started doing their part in this 
respect (Simons, Holcombe & Spellman, 2014; Vazire, 2015). 
However, rewarding replications with a publication is insufficient to make the practice of 
replication a standard practice. This is because replication work, even if publishable, is still 
optional work. Moreover, when competition is high, optional work is relegated. Scientists have 
pressure to produce novel work to keep afloat during the competition and lack an equally intense 
pressure to do confirmation work. This situation undermines their epistemic motivations to find 
the truth. In other words, researchers lack career incentives to do confirmation work. 
To address this sustainability problem, the professional scheme makes confirmation work a 
standard practice for a subgroup of scientists. This is possible because of the separation of reward 
systems for discovery researchers and confirmation researchers. This separation brings several 
advantages. First, the separation creates clear expectations for all researchers. Second, 
confirmation work is no longer relegated as optional because confirmation researchers are 
explicitly required and rewarded to conduct it. Third, given that confirmation researchers do not 
have the pressure to establish novel results, they can sustain confirmation work independently and 
systematically. 
 
4. Three Objections 
4.1. Confirmation work is uninteresting 
Someone could think that confirmation work is uninteresting and, in consequence, nobody would 
like to do only confirmation work. I have three responses. First, the categories of “epistemically 
necessary research” and “interesting” research often do not overlap. If you think that confirmation 
work is epistemically necessary and uninteresting, then you should agree that we should establish 
a system that rewards the scientists who do it. Second, confirmation work as I have characterized 
it (i.e., work that requires a high degree of skill and involves replication, reproduction, meta-
analysis, and theory criticism) is not necessarily uninteresting. Third, rewards determine what is 
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interesting. If confirmation work is a career option, talented scientists who value science not 
primarily for the thrill of discovery will want to do it. 
4.2. Scientific classism 
Someone could think that separating researchers into discovery researchers and confirmation 
researchers would produce scientific classism, with discovery researchers on top. I have two 
responses. First, both kinds of researchers contribute to two different but equally necessary stages 
of the research process. Hence, there is not a justifiable hierarchy in terms of the value of their 
work. Second, to reflect this in practice, as I have specified, confirmation researchers should work 
in confirmation research tracks that offer the same career development opportunities that 
discovery researchers have. Universities should not create hierarchies in terms of salary and other 
benefits between discovery researchers and confirmation researchers. Thus, the professional 
scheme would not create scientific classism.  
4.3. Cost-efficiency 
Someone could wonder whether the professional scheme is a cost-efficient solution to the 
replicability crisis. My response is that I have argued that some scientists in the community should 
be explicitly responsible for conducting confirmation work because the status quo is far from 
efficient. But I have not indicated what proportion should do this job. This issue needs to be 
further studied. This could be done using computer simulation work and asking questions such as 
what distributions of agent types (i.e., discovery researchers and confirmation researchers) are 
optimal given a variety of epistemic goals (e.g., increasing replicability rates to a percentage goal). 
I leave this study for a future occasion. 
 
Conclusion 
The replication crisis reveals that there is a mismatch between the theory and the practice of 
scientific self-correction in the social and behavioral sciences. Nobody is responsible nor 
rewarded for conducting confirmation work. To solve this problem, I have proposed repositioning 
confirmation in science as a professional activity. The professional scheme achieves this by (1) 
distinguishing discovery researchers and confirmation researchers and (2) establishing a distinct 
reward system for the latter. This way, we would make replication work independent, systematic, 
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and sustainable. Intervening on the social structure of science is difficult, given that science is a 
decentralized system. Hence, we need a variety of interventions to establish such a system, and 
they require aligning multiple parties, from funding agencies to universities and departments. 
However, without seriously rethinking scientific institutions, the improvements that statistical and 
methodological reforms can bring will lack the proper platform. 
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